The authors argue that the EU’s practice which finds parent companies liable for anti-trust violations of their subsidiaries ignores the concept of limited liability. They also contends that the current fining policy is less effective in deterring violations than a regime that also incorporates individual sanctions and compliance programmes.

World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, March 2010 (link to website)

Alan Riley, January 2010

The paper argues for a comprehensive reform of EU anti-cartel enforcement to improve deterrence. Reforms should include the introduction of individual sanctions, recognition of the positive impact that compliance programmes can have on deterrence and a revised leniency regime.

The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the European Convention on Human Rights (PDF)
Wouter P.J. Wils, March 2010

Mr Wils, a member of the European Commission’s Legal Service argues against claims that the high level of EU antitrust fines have become criminal in nature, and that the institutional and procedural framework in which they are imposed is no longer compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

The fining policy of the European Commission in competition cases (PDF)
ICC Commission on Competition, July 2009

The ICC criticises the EU’s fining policy for focusing more on punishment and deterrence than on compliance. Such high fines can only be defended where due process is fully respected, but the ICC fears that “increasingly this does not appear to be the case.”

Gregory J. Werden Mr Werden, Senior Economic Counsel, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice argues that cartel deterrence requires both substantial fines on the business enterprises found to have engaged in cartel activity and prison sentences for the culpable executives. Let the punishment fit the crime.  

Whether, and if so how, the EC Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on setting fines for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty are fairly subject to serious criticism (PDF)

Sir Jeremy Lever KCMG, November 2007 

This paper regrets the lack of consultation that preceded publication of the guidelines and criticises the risk that they will lead to “irrational and disproportionate fines” in certain cases. The author believes this could undermine effective compliance and bring the EU institutions into disrepute.BDI – Federation of German Industries  

Rechtsstaatliche Defizite des europäischen Kartellbussengeldverfahrens
Jürgen Schwarze

Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb Heft 1, 2009 (link to website)

Berücksichtigung von Compliance-Programmen in Kartellbussgeldverfahren

Wolfgang Bosch/Birgit Colbus/Antonia Harbusch

Kartellrechtliche Compliance-Programme im Rahmen der Bussgeldbemessung de lege lata und de lege ferenda

Dr. Philipp Voet van Vormizeele

Der Konzern als Adressat von Bussen im EU-Kartellrecht (PDF)

Cartels, Fines and Due Process

GCP

Philip Lowe